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NOTES
The History of the Effect of Foreign Divorce in Pennsylvania
Fourteen years ago Pennsylvanians were advised not to seek foreign'
m 2
divorces.
That advice is sound today. Pennsylvania is still reluctant to
recognize foreign decrees.
Both juristic and social factors have caused this attitude. The juristic
factor arises from the conflict between the desire of Pennsylvania to be the
final arbiter of the marital status of its domiciliary, the respondent, and the
accepted reality that the foreign state, acting on its own domiciliary, the
libellant, necessarily affects that status.3 The dilemma arises from the very
nature of the federal system. The court first noticed these competing considerations in Colvin v. Reed,4 decided in 1867, and observed that "there
is no greater reason why the husband's new domicile should prevail over
the wife's than that hers should prevail over his." 5. The case of Meng v.
Meng, 6 decided in 1943, agreed that the respondent "and her status are as
much the object of the solicitous concern and protection of its laws as the
domestic affairs of a resident of Reno are of the laws of Nevada." 7 Intervening cases have intermittently echoed the same thought. The social considerations militating against the recognition of foreign decrees lie in the
realm of speculation. There is, of course, an understandable reluctance on
the part of Pennsylvania judges to permit Pennsylvania citizens to evade
Pennsylvania divorce laws by obtaining a foreign divorce on a ground not
recognized in Pennsylvania, for example such an unstable ground as
"incompatability," and, even where the ground is recognized, there remains
the general policy in favor of the stability of marriages.
The latest word from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the question of the recognition to be granted a foreign divorce decree is the case of
Esenwein v. Esenwein. The case, typically,9 did not give full faith and
credit to the foreign divorce in question.
I.
The matrimonial domicile was Pennsylvania. The husband, after two
unsuccessful attempts to get a Pennsylvania divorce, spread over a period
i. The word "foreign" shall, throughout this note, refer only to another of the
states of the United States.
2. Shockley, Practical Effects in Pennsylvania of an ex parte Foreign Divorce
(930) 3 PA. BAR Ass'N. Q. 21.
3. Note (1914) 62 U. oF PA. L. REV. 298.
4. 55 Pa. 375 (1867).
5. Id. at 380.
6. 47 Pa. D. & C. 33a (1943).

7. Id. at 35 . 6
8. i53 Pa. Super. 69, 33 A. (2d) 675 (I943), aff'd. 348 Pa. 455, 35 A. (2d) 335
(January 3, 1944) ; (1944) 48 DIcK. L. RE'. 112; (1943) 17 TEmP. L. Q. 466.

9. A more recent case evidencing the same attitude is Comm. v. Boyer, 6 Fayette
L. J. 233 (1943). Therein the parties were domiciled in Pennsylvania, and the husband, after discontinuing a Pennsylvania divorce action, obtained a three month leave
of absence from his Pennsylvania employer, and obtained a Nevada divorce during the
three months. The Court said, at 236, "The idea persists that the decision in the
Williams case means that a state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to grant
a divorce upon a mere transient residence of the petitioning spouse though neither
spouse is domiciled within the state." The idea and the Nevada divorce were held not
valid in Pennsylvania. For citicism of an Illinois decision that was in accord with
the quoted idea, see Note (1943) 22 CHICAGO-KENT L. R. 77.
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of some twenty years, finally obtained a Nevada decree on a ground not
recognized in Pennsylvania. The wife had been served with process but had
not entered an appearance. The Pennsylvania action was for the revocation
of an outstanding support order, and the Superior Court, in denying relief,
stated that the husband's "Nevada residence was merely for the purpose of
obtaining the divorce," 10 that "he stayed at a hotel," and that these circumstances are not "under our decisions . . . regarded as the essentials of

domicil." 11

It is to be noted that there were no factors, such as the legiti-

macy of children, to constrain the Court to recognize the decree on grounds
of comity. Thus the reason given by the Court for denying the validity of
2
the decree was the lack of a bona fide domicile on the part of the libellant."
It will appear that this was the last resort open to the Court.
If the law of a state can suffer a shock, the law of Pennsylvania certainly did by the decision in Williams v. North Carolina.13 That case held,
in effect, that a divorce granted by the state of the domicile of one of the
spouses must be granted full faith and credit,' 4 assuming, of course, adequate notice. This rule applies at the very least to cases where the parties
admit the bona fides of the libellants domicile.
However, by its very terms, 15 the decision left two ways by which a
state court could deny the validity of the foreign decree--(i) by finding that
the libellant did not have a bona fide domicile in the divorcing state. (Of
course the state courts, historically, could always find that to be true, and
thus the divorcing state would have no jurisdiction over the parties, even
10. 153 Pa. Super. 69, 75, 33 A. (2d) 675, 677 (1943).

ii. Id. at 74, 33 A. (2d) at 677. However, the foreign decree is prima facie valid
and the burden is on the spouse attacking it to produce contrary evidence. But if the
libellant puts the entire foreign record in evidence, the other party may make inferences
of fact from it. In 348 Pa. 455, 457, 35 A. (2d) 335, 337 (i944), affirming the Superior Court decision in the Esenwein case, the dissenting opinion of Justices Drew
and Maxey added that the wife should have adduced "affirmative proof that appellant
was not domiciled in the State of Nevada at the time he instituted his action there, and
therefore [since the wife had not done so] this Court is bound to give full faith and
credit to the Nevada decree." (At 467, 35 A. (2d) at 340.)
12. The dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court brings forth the fact (at 463, 35
A. (2d) at 339). that the husband sold his business before leaving Pennsylvania. This
may show intent to abandon his Pennsylvania domicile but does not show intent to
adopt any other specific domicile. As a matter of fact, after leaving Nevada (the day
the decree was rendered) he went to Ohio, where he has remained.
13. 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (I942). Hirsch, In Memoriam:
Haddock v. Haddock (943)
14 PA. BAR Ass'N. Q. 232; (943)
41 MI6H. L. REv.
755; (1943) 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 565
14. In the Williams case the prosecuted parties had obtained their respective divorces in Nevada and then remarried in Nevada. The question has arisen whether the
result of the case would have been different if the parties had remarried in North
Carolina instead of Nevada. Bingham, Song of Sixpence, Some Comments on Williams v. North Carolina (1943) 39 CoRN. L. Q. 12. The validity of the marriage is
determined by the law of the state where the marriage is contracted. GoosicH, CONFLIcr or LAWS (1929) § 113. Thus here Nevada, recognizing its own decree, would
call the marriage valid and therefore it would be valid in all jurisdictions except those
declaring the remarriage of recently divorced .parties against public policy. But North
Carolina, not recognizing such a foreign decree, would call the marriage invalid if contracted in North Carolina. Thus the Supreme Court, where the remarriage occurred
in North Carolina, in order to sustain the conviction, would only have to declare the
decree not entitled to full faith and credit and not also have t6 uproot a marriage
which was entered into in a manner generally conceded to be valid. However, the remarriage in the divorcing state has not influenced Pennsylvania. Melnick v. Melnick,
154 Pa. Super. 481, 488 (1944).
15. 317 U.

S. 287, 292, 302, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 210, 215, 87 L. Ed. 279, 282, 288

(1942), where the Court noted the first exception. The second is a general one under
"due process of law," see note 23 infra.
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though both of the spouses appeared. 16) (2) By finding that the notice
was not in accord with the requirements of due process. Therefore nothing
new was added, but all the former methods of invalidation except the above
two were taken away.
This decision forced Pennsylvania to go farther in validating foreign
decrees of divorce than it had ever gone before.' 7 The previous high-water
mark in voluntary recognition by Pennsylvania is to be found in the case

of Commonwealth v. Custer,'8 in 1941, and the case leading up to it."'
The decision in the Custer case was anticipated by a 1928 dictum. 20 That
dictum suggested, in substance, that if the libellant had been divorced for
grounds recognized in Pennsylvania, and with notice as authorized by the
foreign state, the decree should be accorded recognition. Pennsylvania, by
statute, had by 1913 21 permitted its courts to grant decrees of divorce
where both the marriage and the cause'of divorce had occurred in a foreign state, and where the respondent was served by publication only, as
provided by the Pennsylvania rules for published service. The parties
in this case had been married in the state of Washington, and had gone to
live in Missouri, where the desertion which was relied on as the ground
for divorce occurred. The divorce was granted in Illinois, the domicile
of only one spouse. But, perhaps unfortunately, the actual basis of the decision was estoppel. 2 2 The husband, who was here attempting to get a reconveyance of property from his second wife on the ground that the marriage
was bigamous, was estopped to deny the existence of a valid marriage since
he knew, when he married her and when he conveyed the property
through another to the entireties, that he had received a foreign divorce
from his first wife, and nor would ignorance of the law be a basis for a
reconveyance.
6. RESTATEMET, CONFLIcT oF LAWS (1934) § III. However, Comm. v. Parker,
59 Pa. Super. 74 (1915) seems contra. Therein the spouse had entered a general appearance and contested the husband's Nevada petition for a divorce on the merits.
In the Pennsylvania case, as defendant in an action by the husband for vacation of an
outstanding support order, she attacked the validity of the Nevada decree on the ground
that the libellant had not had a bona fide domicile there. The Court said that "She
was under no compulsion to file any answer, but having chosen to do so, she must
accept the consequences which the law attaches to such an act" (at 78) and continued
(at 8o), saying that she had "specifically asked for the protection that is afforded to
her under the laws of the state of Nevada." Cf. Davis v. Davis, note 40 infra.
17. Hirsch, note 13 supra, at 235-236.
18. 145 Pa. Super. 535, 21 A. (2d) 524 (1941).
ig. Com. ex reL. Cronbardt v. Cronhardt, 135 Pa. Super. 117, 4 A. (2d) 589

(1938). Therein the wife had left the matrimonial domicile and gone to Pennsylvania. The husband continued to live at the matrimonial domicile (Maryland), but
divided his time between there and Philadelphia. The wife here sued for a reinstatement of a support order arguing that the Maryland divorce, although obtained at the
matrimonial domicile with constructive service, was void because the husband had
established a domicile in Philadelphia by the time the divorce proceedings were instituted. This, it was contended, was a fraud on the Maryland court. The Superior
Court held that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to attack the decree collaterally. The Court said (at 123, 4 A. (2d) at 592) that "Some of the reasons leading us to this conclusion are: the remarriage of the defendant; the long delay upon
[her] . . . part . . . in demanding support from defendant; her assertion that
the Mfaryland court was imposed upon by the false representation of the defendant that
relator's whereabout were unknown to him; and her charge that the defendant practiced a fraud upon that court by falsely testifying he was domiciled in that state.
"In our opinion, these matters should be litigated in a direct attack upon the decree in the court which entered it. Upon this record, as it now stands, we think it
should be given full faith and credit in our courts. '
2o. Ray v. Ray, io Pa. D. & C. 733 (1928).
21. Act of May 9, 1913, P. L. i91, retained in the codification of all Pennsylvania
divorce laws, Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237.
22. See p. 429 infra.
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Had Pennsylvania courts followed the dictum in that case foreign
divorces would have been valid in Pennsylvania if (i) the cause of divorce
was recognized in Pennsylvania as a ground and (2) if the notice given
was in accord with the statute of the foreign state and due process. 2 But,
until 1941, the test was relegated to the status of a "consideration" in passing on the validity of foreign decrees.
In 1941 Commonwealth v. Custer24 was handed down. In that case the
parties had been married in Pennsylvania, the divorce had been obtained
in Illinois, which was not the matrimonial domicile, by one party, for a
cause of divorce recognized in Pennsylvania, and with notice in accordance with the Illinois statute. The Court admitted at some length that
under no rule of Pennsylvania law need full faith and credit be extendedbut held that on grounds of comity Pennsylvania would recognize its
validity. A beautifully executed opinion set forth the two headings under
which recognition may be granted such decrees. The first was full faith
and credit. Thereunder the Court explained that since the divorce had not
been obtained at the matrimonial domicile, and since the wife had not
appeared, the decree need not be granted full faith and credit. It stated
that no Federal Supreme Court or Pennsylvania decision had approved
the doctrine, which it therefore rejected, that if one spouse wrongfully
leaves the other, the wronged spouse may get a foreign divorce entitled to
full faith and credit.2 5 The second heading was comity. Thereunder the
Court reviewed the changes in Pennsylvania divorce law which permitted
Pennsylvania courts to grant a divorce even though the other spouse was
not domiciled in Pennsylvania and was only served constructively. Then
it proceeded to show that this was a "proper case" in which to recognize
the foreign decree on the principle of comity. It noted that the libellant had
acquired a bona fide domicile in the divorcing state; the decree was on a
ground recognized in Pennsylvania; the divorcing court knew of the existence of children; the type of notice given would have been sufficient under
Pennsylvania law; desertion by respondent was not denied; the legitimacy
of a child was involved; and the respondent was supporting those borne
him by the libellant. Of course the Court retained its discretion, and said
that recognition should be extended "in a proper case," 26 and took pains
to italicize that phrase.
Thus the U. S. Supreme Court, in the Williams case, forced the courts
of Pennsylvania to recognize divorces which it would not have recognized
even on the basis of comity. By the rule of the Custer case recognition
might be granted if the grounds for divorce were good grounds in Pennsylvania. The Williams case had no such requirement, but rather said that
if the divorce was good in the foreign state, for whatever grounds the foreign state may set up, it must be recognized under the full faith and credit
clause, assuming, of course, bona fide domicile and adequate notice.

II.
The position thus imposed on the Pennsylvania courts was against
all prior Pennsylvania case law. The problem of the validity of a foreign
decree of divorce arose directly in Pennsylvania for the first time in 1867.- 7
Prior to that date the interstate divorce problem had been restricted to the
23. This is necessary because of the 14th Amendment.
§ iio, comment b.

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT

OF LAWS (1934)

24. 145 Pa. Super. 535, 21 A. (2d) 524 (1941).
25. See note 49 ifra.
26. Id. at 547, 21 A. (2d) at 529 (italics omitted in unofficial report).

27. Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867).
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question whether Pennsylvania would grant a divorce to a person domiciled in Pennsylvania, although the other spouse was domiciled elsewhere,
and the cause for the divorce had arisen elsewhere. 2 Until i85o the29courts
But
uniformly denied that they had jurisdiction to grant such decrees.
since that time the problem has been largely resolved by statute, for in that
year the legislature commenced the passage of statutes authorizing divorces
when only one spouse was domiciled in Pennsylvania, even though the
grounds for the divorce had arisen elsewhere. 0
In Colvin v. Reed 31 the problem arose directly. The plaintiff was
seeking'dower rights. Her husband had been granted a decree of divorce
in Iowa, where he had acquired a bona fide domicile. But the Pennsylvania
wife had at no time been in Iowa, had never received notice of the proceedings, and was entirely ignorant of the fact that they had been instituted.
The Court went into a lengthy discussion of the dilemma raised by the
fact, referred to above, 32 that while both states had jurisdiction of one party,
and could determine the status of the person subject to its jurisdiction, still,
in divorce, the status of one could not be altered without changing the
status of the other. The rights of Iowa and Pennsylvania thus stood "in
equipoise." The Court concluded that the husbands remedy was in Pennsylvania, the state of domicile of the wife as well as the state of the alleged
offense. We may reason from this that the state where the defendant was
domiciled was ruled to be the only state with jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
Reduced to its lowest terms it may be said that the rule laid down therein
8
was that both parties must be domiciled in the state granting the divorce."
28. Pennsylvania did not recognize the right of the wife to acquire a separate domicile until around 1843 according to the case of Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449 (1847),
interpreting the Act of April i8, 1843, P. L. 34o. Prior to that time the wife's domicile followed the husband's. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (834) § 46.
29. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349 (Pa. 1838). This was the only early case on
the question and the holding seems to have been based on the fact that the acts complained of were committed while the domicile of the parties was the state of Ohio.
3o. Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449 (1847).
Thet Act of April I8, 1843, P. L.
340, provided for the wife's separate domicile for purposes of Pennsylvania divorce
proceedings where her husband's actions had caused her departure and where she had
acquired a bona fide residence in Pennsylvania for one year. However, it wasn't
clear whether the statute applied to cases where the cause for divorce had also arisen
in a foreign state. The Act of February 27, 1847, P. L. i6g, permitted divorces to be
granted to a party domiciled in Pennsylvania when the respondent was domiciled elsewhere if the adultery was committed in Pennsylvania. The Act of April 26, i85o, P.
L. 59o § 6, finally resolved the difficulty by stating that its courts could divorce the
parties even though the adultery or desertion had occurred elsewhere. I FREEDMAN,
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIvORCE IN PXNNSYLVANIA (1939)

§§ 114, 125.

31. 55 Pa. 375 (867).
32. See p. 421 supra.
33. This rule has only infrequently been put into judicial opinions as stated. In
Comm. ex reL. v. Milne, 22 Pa. D. & C. 389, 39o (935) the Court said, "Since there
was no personal service upon the wife, the validity of the decree . . . depends upon
whether the parties ever had a matrimonial domicile in the said [divorcing] state."
See also, Hirsch, note 13 supra, at 235-236.
The rule for recognition, as laid down in Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, 315 (i869),
was "that the injured party in the marriage relation must seek redress in the forum of
the defendant, unless where such defendant has removed from what was before the
common domicile of both." As to the first part, it can be seen that the plaintiff must
also be a domiciliary of the state where he sues for divorce, for all divorce laws have,
in the past, required domicile on the part of the libellant at least. The only possible
exception would be if a state would pass a divorce statute providing that the libellant
need not acquire domicile in order to obtain a divorce, but it is likely that such a statute would be void. 17 Am. JuR., Divorce and Separation, § 757. The second part,
if it means that the libellant need not seek his divorce in the respondents forum under
such circumstances, was later changed by Platt's Appeal, go Pa. 501 (1876), where
the wife had left the common domicile and the divorce was obtained in a state other
than her new domicile and was held invalid in Pennsylvania.
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Under this view of the law the Pennsylvania courts logically refused
to recognize foreign divorces for the still more basic reason, implied in
the general rule, that the courts of the other state had no jurisdiction over
the libellant. Thus in i86o 34 a foreign divorce was held not entitled to full
faith and credit in Pennsylvania on the ground that the libellant resided
in the foreign state solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. Fortytwo years later a lower court added that even the voluntary appearance of
the other spouse could not remedy that defect.3 5

In 1876 this rule was carried to the point of denying full faith and
credit to a Michigan decree granted to a man whose wife was domiciled
in Wisconsin, when the parties had never lived together in Pennsylvania.36
They had married in New York. The decree resulted in a reduced share
of the estate going to a woman who claimed to have married the decedent
after his alleged divorce, and by whom he had had one child. There is
nothing in the report to intimate that the case would have been decided

differently had the legitimacy of a child been at issue. But the case strictly
followed the old Pennsylvania rule.
3
Thus, until the decision in Atherton v. Atherton"
the Pennsylvania
rule was certain. Both parties had to be domiciled in the divorcing state in
order for the courts thereof to have jurisdiction entitling the decree rendered to full faith and credit in the courts of Pennsylvania. There was
much discussion in the cases about lack of notice to and service on the
respondent, and that the cause of divorce had arisen in a foreign state, but
in all the cases there was the common factor that even though the respondent was personally served or had notice of the suit,38 still the courts of the
foreign state did not have the power to compel the appearance of the
respondent-they lacked jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.3 9
Of course, if the respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court, by entering an appearance,4 0 and the libellant had acquired a bona
34. Rebstock v. Rebstock, 2 Pitts. Rep. 124 (I86o).
35. Comm. v. Simmen, 5o Pitts. L. J. 261 (1902). This is the general rule, 27
C. J. S. § 332. Contra: Comm. v. Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (1915).
See note 16
supra and note 4o infra.
36. Platt's Appeal, go Pa. 50, (1876).
37. i8I U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (igoi).
38. Note Comm. v. Simmen, 5o Pitts. L. J. 261 (19o2); Comm. v. Taylor, i Susq.
L. C. 14 (1878) ; Comm. v. Maize, 23 W. N. C. 572 (i889) ; Appeal of Zerfass, 135 Pa.
522, 19 Atl. io56 (189o); Comm. v. Steiger, x2 Pa. Co. Ct. 334 (1892)'; Davis v.
Davis, 2 Pa. Dist. 621 (1893).
39. Where service was made on the defendant wife in Pennsylvania in a Missouri divorce proceeding the Court said: "This service was absolutely void, and the
writ was of no validity in the State of Pennsylvania." Comm. v. Maize, 23 W. N. C.
572, 573 (Pa. I889). " . . the process must be personally served upon the defendant, or he must appear in person or by attorney in the action, and it must be* served
upon the defendant while he is within the jurisdiction of the sovereignty under which
the court acts, for no sovereign has the right to issue such notice to the citizen of
another state or country and thereby draw the party from his own proper forum ad
aliam examere. . . ." Comm. v. Bolich, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 401, 4o6 (1896).
4o. A forged appearance, of course, has no effect. In one case two experts said
it was forged and one said it wasn't. No witnesses were called who saw the appearance being signed. Held, that a forged appearance was of no effect. Comm. ex reL
Nolde v. Nolde, 105 Pa. Super. 334, I61 Atl. 450 (1932).
An injunction against a foreign proceeding in divorce does not amount to an appearance. Comm. v. Kuestner, 30 Pa. D. & C. 634 (937).
The confusing case of Davis v. Davis, 3o5 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26
(1938) seems to lay down the rule that a special appearance, if it goes beyond a
mere challenge to the jurisdiction over the petitioner's person to a challenge over the jurisdiction of the subject matter becomes a general appearance.
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fide domicile, the foreign court thus was given jurisdiction and the decree
granted was entitled to full faith and credit.4 1 This is still true in Pennsylvania and is the general rule in all states.12 However, it must be added
that in certain cases the Pennsylvania
courts would have scrutinized with
43
great care the alleged appearance.
Slightly past the turn of the present century the cases of Haddock v.
Haddock 44 and Atherton. v. Atherton 45 were handed down by the U. S.
Supreme Court. The Haddock case, factually stated, held that where a
husband leaves the matrimonial domicile, and obtains a divorce in a sister
state, the state of the matrimonial domicile need not give full faith and
credit to the foreign decree. Atherton v. Atherton decided. that a divorce
granted in a state which was the domicile of one party, as well as the matrimonial domicile, must be given full faith and credit even though notice was
only by publication, so long as the notice met the requirements of due
process.
Eminent authorities conflict on the manner of reconciling the two
cases. One line suggests that the divorce must always be granted at the
matrimonial domicile in order to be entitled to full faith and credit.4 8 That
is the more simple method of achieving harmony between the two cases.
Another says that if one spouse wrongfully leaves the other, he or she may
not get a foreign decree of divorce entitled to full faith and credit; but if
the separation is caused by the other spouse's wrong, or by consent of the
parties, the divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit.47 We might
term these latter the "fault" and "consent" approaches. They require drawing conclusions from the facts of the two cases, however. The actual
holdings state no such theories. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws
embraces all these doctrines in the disjunctive.4
Whatever the effect of the Haddock case on Pennsylvania law, and
it seems that it had none, since it merely said under what conditions foreign decrees of divorce need not be recognized, and Pennsylvania had been
not recognizing them all along, the Atherton case was bound to have effect.
By that decision the state of the domicile of one party could grant a divorce
entitled to full faith and credit, while theretofore both parties had to be
Note (1939) 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 648; (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 487. It seems that
the Court, in a decision only a few weeks later, considered the judgment of the court
of the divorcing state to have been res judicata on the jurisdictional question. Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172, 59 Sup. Ct. 134, 137-138, 83 L. Ed. lO4, 109, n. 13
(938).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLicT OF LAws (1934) § 451, contains a caveat on the
matter. This caveat was not contained in the Tentative Draft (1925).
41. Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 2o Pa. Dist. 678 (1911). "The jurisdiction once
conceded, the proper exercise of the power cannot be inquired into. . . ." Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 375, 381 (z867). Comm. v. Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (i915) goes so
far as to say that the libellant's domicile need not be bona fide if the respondent has
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by making a general appearance, or answer.
42. 17 Am. JTR., Divorce and Separation, § 756; RESATEMENT, CoNFucT OF LAWs
(i934) § 113, comment d.
43. In Comm. v. Simmen, 5o Pitts. L. J. 261, 262 (1902), where the divorce was
invalidated because the libellant did not have a bona fide domicile in the forum granting it, and therefore the appearance entered by the respondent did not enter the decision in the case, the Court added that had the domicile of the libellant been bona fide,
"and the validity of the divorce depended on the power of attorney, we would not have
hesitated to find that it had been improperly obtained from Mrs. Simmen.
44. 2o U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 5o L. Ed. 867 (igo6). Bingham, Haddock v.
Haddock (z936) 21 CoRxu. L. Q. 393.
45. 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (190).
46. McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 YALE L.

J. 564.

47. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARv. L. RLv. 417.
48. (1934) § 113.
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domiciled in the divorcing state. In addition the service upon the respondent was required to meet the requisites for due process.
The Pennsylvania courts did not adopt the "fault" doctrine, expounded
by Professor Beale. 49 They had a chance to in 1911, in a case the facts
of which were comparable to the Haddock facts (except that the wife
was the party obtaining the foreign divorce). 0 The Court merely stated
that "the cause of divorce occurred in Pennsylvania, and there was no
personal service upon the respondent," and thence refused to give full faith
and credit to the decree.

In I9I9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had a chance to approve
the "consent" doctrine, but did not."- The parties had been married in

Pennsylvania and then agreed to separate. The husband obtained a Nevada
divorce. The facts omit to state what, if any, notice was given to the
Pennsylvania wife, but were content to read that she was not "lawfully
served with judicial process. 52 Lawful service being restricted to the
court's territorial jurisdiction," that statement merely means that she
was never in Nevada, but does not exclude the possibility of service by pub-

lication, or by handing her the papers.5 4
The influence of the A therton case can be seen in Wells v. Wells, 5 5 in
1925. There the parties were married in Delaware and ten years later
the husband left the wife to live in Pennsylvania, taking one of the children
with him. The wife obtained a decree of divorce in Delaware, and was
given custody of the children. The husband received no notice. In an
action to obtain custody of the children the Court held that the divorce
was entitled to full faith and credit, although the award of custody was not.
It is interesting to note that the Atherton case is distinguishable on its
facts, since in the instant case there was no notice, while the Atherton case
only required recognition of a divorce granted by the state of the matrimonial domicile where notice was given. Therefore, according to the
dictum in this case, a divorce granted by the matrimonial
5 6 domicile should
be given full faith and credit in the Pennsylvania courts.

49. This theory, one of the two set forth above, was presented in Professor Beale's
famous article, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 417. In that article these
conclusions, among others, were drawn from the Haddock case: "i. If the husband
wrongfully leaves the wife, and seeks a new domicile, he cannot there get a divorce
which will be entitled to full faith and credit. 2. If he acquires a new domicile . . .
because of the wife's wrong, he may there obtain a decree of divorce which will be
entitled to full faith and credit. . . . 4. The wife's power to get a binding divorce
is the same as the husband's." (at 42o.)
5o. Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 20 Pa. Dist. 678 (1911). The cause of divorce had
arisen in Pennsylvania and the Court, as usual, mentioned the fact as though it controlled the case. Nevertheless the respondent was not domiciled nor did he appear in
the foreign state. He did not have notice of the proceedings.
51. Grossman's Estate, 263 Pa. 139, io6 Atl. 86 (i919).
52. Id. at 140, io6 Atl. at 87.
53. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS (934) § 73.
54. Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa. 464, 469, lO9 Atl. 220, 221 (192o). Defendant "attempted to serve her with process in Johnstown, in this State, by causing to be read to
her some paper the contents of which are not shown, [and then] obtained a divorce.
."
The service was invalid. In that case Pennsylvania was the matrimonial domicile and the husband's foreign divorce was not respected by the Supreme Court as a
defense to the wife's suit for maintenance.
55. 7 Pa. D. & C. 643 (1925).
56. However, the case seems to have been badly reasoned. The Atherton case
was cited for the proposition that the Delaware decree awarding the custody of the
children to the mother had, without actual notice, no binding force on the respondent.
The Atherton case actually had nothing to do with the custody of children. However,
it does not seem wrong to state that the Atherton case did influence the decision.

NOTES

Pennsylvania had thus been forced by the Atherton decision to retire
from the position that both parties must be domiciled in the divorcing
state,5 7 to the view that only one need be domiciled there if it was the
matrimonial domicile. Returning to modern times we found that the
Custer decision inserted another exception based on the common sense
idea that what Pennsylvania does it should permit other jurisdictions to do.
From that position we reach the present state of affairs brought about by
the Williams case and the Esenwein use of it, which eliminated the matrimonial domicile aspect of the Atherton case entirely and substituted for
it any state where a spouse had or acquired a bona fide domicile as a state
capable of giving a decree entitled to full faith and credit, assuming adequate notice.
III.

Occasionally foreign divorces have been upheld in Pennsylvania on
the ground of estoppel. It has been held that a wife who remarries on
the strength of her husband's foreign divorce, will-not be allowed successfully to attack its validity because thus she would be making a bigamist of
herself. 58 The general idea is that a right cannot be established by setting
up the turpitude of the person claiming it.
Also, there is a general rule that a divorce may not be questioned by
the spouse who obtained it.9 The one exception is under Section 733 of
the Penal Code.60 In the case on point the second wife, in a criminal
prosecution for non-support, claimed that the defendant was estopped to
deny the validity of a Mexican decree of divorce based on less than one
day's residence. But the second wife had been aware of the divorce, and
had accepted a proposal of marriage before it was procured. The Court
stated that "We do not mean to repudiate the general doctrine that the
validity of a divorce decree cannot be questioned by the spouse who obtains
it.... We limit ourselves to a holding that in a proceeding under Section
733 of the Penal Code it may be questioned by the husband who procures
the invalid decree, particularly where the relatrix participated in the procurement to the extent here shown." 61
Of course in these cases of estoppel we cannot really say that the
divorce is being upheld. We can merely say that the court will not permit
this particular individual to attack its validity.

IV.
Formerly the only way in which a foreign decree could be attacked
was collaterally in some proceeding such as a probate proceeding, or a
suit for support, or revocation of a support order. In many instances
such a remedy was inadequate. Many persons might wish to know their
exact status before setting out on a certain course of conduct in order to
57. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (Tentative Draft, 1925) § 118, Special
Note I, expresses the thought that both parties must be domiciled in the divorcing
state by stating that the divorce must be obtained at the domicile of the defendant
spouse. The two statements actually say the same thing, because even if the defendant
spouse is domiciled in the divorcing state, the plaintiff must acquire domicile there in
order to be able to obtain a divorce. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)

§§ 54,

110,

1I, 127,

135,

comment a.

58. Estate of W. T. Richardson, Deceased, 132 Pa. 292, 19 Atl. 82 (189o). Accord: Grimm v. Grimm, 24 Pa. Dist. go (1914) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs
(I934) § 112.
59. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs (934) § 112.
6o. Comm. ex rel. Allison v. Allison, 151 Pa. Super. 369, 3o A. (2d) 365 (I943).
61. Id. at 372-373, 3o A. (2d) at 367.
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avoid the risks inherent in not knowing whether they were married or
single.

In 1923 Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act."2 But the Superior Court held in 1928 that this Act did not give
63
jurisdiction to Pennsylvania courts to declare decrees of divorce invalid.
This was not in accord with the general interpretation of the Act by other
states that had adopted it.64

In 1935 an amendment was added to the

Act 65 which widened its scope. 68 Under this amendment a declaratory
judgment was rendered in 1937 by a lower court decreeing that the divorce
obtained by the husband of the petitioner in a foreign state did not dissolve the marriage.67 The question came up to the Superior Court again
in 1942 in Melnick v. Melnick 68 in which it was held that in order for a
case to come under the Declaratory Judgments Act it was not necessary
for property rights to be involved when the validity of a divorce was at

issue because the "concrete interest" of each party, required by the amendment, was in the continuance of the marriage relation. Of course if there is
another specific statutory remedy, that remedy must be followed, and a general common law or equity remedy will bar suit for a declaratory judgment if the case is "ripe for relief by way of such.., remedy." 69

V.
Thus in Pennsylvania today a divorce will be valid if the libellant
actually acquires a domicile in the divorcing state, which fact is, it seems,
not too easy to prove, and adequate notice is given to the respondent. Failure to enter an appearance will no longer prevent the spouse from obtainIng a divorce entitled to full faith and credit. Refusing to go into the
divorcing state has no effect. It is possible, however, to have a Pennsylvania domiciliary enjoined from going into another state in order to get a
divorce.70 The courts will grant such injunctions 71 in order to prevent
the evasion of the laws of Pennsylvania, and, it has been held, 72 because the
"acts . . . threatened . . . subject the plaintiff [respondent] to irreparable
damage." 71
62. Act of June I8, 1923, P. L. 84o.
63. McCalmont v. McCalmont, 93 Pa. Super. 203 (1928).
64. BORCHARD, DEcLARAToRY JUDGMENTS (1934) 392.

65. Act of April 25, 1935, P. L. 72.
66. Moore v. Moore, 344 Pa. 324, 327, 25 A. (2d) 130, 131 (1942).
67. Lansinger v. Lansinger, 30 Pa. D. & C. 291 (1937).
68. 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. (2d) III (1942). Melnick v. Melnick, 154 Pa.
Super. 481, 36 A. (2d) 235 (944).
69. Note 58 supra. Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 571, 25 A. (2d) III,
115, set forth three requirements in the disjunctive: "(I) An actual controversy exists
between contending parties; or (2) the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are
present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation;
or (3) the court is satisfied that a party asserts a legal relation, status, right or privilege in which he has a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of such
asserted relation, status, right or privilege by an adversary party who also has or
asserts a concrete interest therein, and the court is also satisfied that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the uncertainty, or controversy, giving rise to the proceedings." Dissenting Judge Kenworthey did not disagree with these requirements
but was of the opinion that the plaintiff had not asserted any concrete interest.
70. See, generally, Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments
in Migratory Divorce (1935) 2 LAW AND CoNTmsP. PRoB. 370.
71. An injunction against a foreign proceeding in divorce does not amount to an
appearance. Comm. v. Kuestner, 30 Pa. D. & C. 634 (1937).
72. Meng v. Meng, 47 Pa. D. & C. 33a (943).
73. Id. at 35a, quoting RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (934) § 96, comment a.
The objections of the defendant were not to the inherent power of Pennsylvania to
issue such an injunction, but were to the service of process.

NOTES

And, on the basis of past conduct, it seems likely that the courts of
74
Pennsylvania will continue their strict stand on the question of domicile,
although the modern trend is toward a looser interpretation of the concept. So-called "migratory divorces," 75 which are the real divorce problem, will only be reluctantly recognized-being subject to invalidation on
the ground of the lack of a bona fide domicile. But, if the spouse does go
into the sister state, and establishes an actual domicile there,7 the decree
will be granted full faith and credit, and there is no reason why it should
not be granted. Even though the act of the other state in divorcing a couple
has effects on the property of both in Pennsylvania, we must keep in mind
that the act of a state in marrying a couple does also-the effect of divorce
is only to end those interests formerly created. The argument that the
husband's new domicile would thus prevail over the wife's does not take
into account the hardship it would be on the libellant to be required in all
cases to acquire domicile in his wife's state, which might require giving
up his business, his contacts, and his home, to plead at the bar of her state.
Or it would even be worse to stigmatize a later wife who married him on
the strength of his divorce, bastardize her children and take away her dower
in his Pennsylvania property. But whatever the reason, it seems clear
that a foreign decree, obtained in good faith, will be recognized by the Pennsylvania courts.
However, since the Supreme Court of North Carolina has again
reviewed the Williams case, 77 and found expressly that the libellants had
no bona fide domicile in Nevada, it is highly probable that the United States
Supreme Court will again have the opportunity to reconsider the matter.
F. G. K., Jr.

Those Weasel Words-"Wilful and Wanton"
I
"Words are the principal tools of lawyers and judges, whether
we like it or not. They are to us what the scalpel and insulin are
to the doctor, or a theodolite and sliderule to the civil engineer.
So we need to know more about their imperfections." 1
74. Illustrating the Pennsylvania requirements for a bona fide domicile is Comm.
v. Boyer, 6 Fayette L. J. 233, 939-24o. A dictum therein proclaimed that ". . . even
if he [the libellant] had testified unequivocally, as he did not, to an intention to make
Nevada his future home, a self-serving declaration not followed by acts in accord with
it would have to be regarded as less important than the intention that his conduct so
plainly indicates."
75. See the symposium on Migratory Divorce

(1935)

2

LAW
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289, for a general discussion.
76. "Practically all American courts allow the wife to establish a separate domicil to sue for divorce whenever she chooses." GooDlmcH,

CONFLICT OF LAws (1927)

§32 (2).

The husband can always acquire a separate domicile. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) § 27. However, the RESTATEMENT says that the wife can do so only

when it does not constitute desertion by the laws of the state in which both were domiciled at the time of the separation (at §28) ; the other spouse, by reason of his "misconduct has ceased to have the right to object" (§ 113) ; "the state is the last state in
which the spouses were domiciled together as man and wife" (§ 113).
77. Noted Divorce Case Question Again Raised (April 22, 1944) 92 PrIrs. L.
J. 3.
s. Chafee, The Disorderly Conrduct of Words (sg94i) 41 COt.. L. Rwv. 381, 382.

432

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Under the prevailing terminology in the Pennsylvania cases a possessor of land is liable to a trespasser, as a general rule, only for wilful and
Under the latest decisions of the Pennsylvania
wanton misconduct.2
Supreme Court where the defendant is guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct contributory negligence is no defense. 3 Consequently, in a case
in which a trespasser plaintiff is otherwise entitled to recover, his contributory negligence would seem to be immaterial. If this conclusion is
not to follow it can only be because the expression "wilful and wanton"
misconduct has different meanings when applied to different types of cases.
The purpose of this note is to emphasize the chameleon-like characteristics of the phrase "wilful and wanton" and the inevitable confusion and
ambiguity which result when the same words are used to signify two ideas
which are close together and overlap.4 Emphasis will be placed on Pennsylvania law in which recent cases have created the apparent enigma presented in the first paragraph of this note in the hope that this may aid in
the future clarification, either by the courts or the legislature, of this much
used tort terminology.
The language from two Pennsylvania cases, both decided by the same
judge, will serve as an introductory illustration of the pitfalls confronting
a court in the practical definition and application of a term which has a
highly abstract, if not artificial, basis.
In Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,5 Mr. Justice Stem
stated that "it is wanton negligence, within the meaning of the law, to fail
to use ordinary and reasonable care to avoid injury to a trespasser after
his presence has been ascertained." 6
In Kasanovich v. George,7 he stated that "wanton misconduct is something different from negligence however gross,-different not merely in
degree but in kind, and evincing a different state of mind on the part of
the tortfeasor. Negligence consists of inattention and inadvertence, whereas
wantonness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so
recklessly disregarded that, even though there is no actual intent, there is
at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." I
Obviously the two propositions are dissimilar, and yet substantially
the same coiisequence-producing language ("wanton negligence" having
been refined into "wanton misconduct") is applied to both. The difficulties
encountered by the Pennsylvania court are not peculiar to this state alone,
for the mass of litigation 9 which has arisen around these words indicates
that the standard which they attempt to establish has proved to be generally
unsatisfactory. 0
2. Mulherrin v. Del. L. & W. R. R., 81 Pa. 366 (876);
Gillespie v. McGowan,
Ioo Pa. 144 (1882); McGinnis v. Peoples Bros., 249 Pa. 335, 94 At. 925 (1915);
Cover v. Hershey Transit Co., 29o Pa. 551, 139 Atl. 266 (1927) ; Dumanski v. City of
Erie, 348 Pa. 505, 34 A. (2d) 5o8 (1943) ; Pravlik v. City Deposit Bank and Trust
Co., 348 Pa. 5o8, 34 A. (2d) 510 (1943).
3. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943) ; Misorski v. Pennsylvania R. R., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A. (2d) 526 (1943).
4. Chafee, note I supra, at 387.
5. 337 Pa. 136, 2o A. (2d) 576 (1940).
6. Id. at 140-141, IO A. (2d) at 578.
7. 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (I943).
8. Id. at 203, 34 A. (2d) at 525.
9. See 45 C. J. 67,-674, for cases which attempt to distinguish wilfulness and
wantonness from negligence. See 45 C. J. 667-671, for cases which attempt to distinguish gross negligence from wantonness and wilfulness. The profusion of these
cases is a tacit admission of the difficulties these words present.
Io. See Cooley, Problems in Contributory Negligence (941) 89 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 335, 349.

NOTES

It would seem desirable to analyze first the various definitions of
"wilful and wanton" (along with related synonyms) before considering
their application and effect in specific cases.
From a strictly analytical viewpoint the most objectionable term is
"wilful negligence". The two words are mutually exclusive: 1 negligence
denotes the absence of any intention to invade the interest of another, while
"wilful" indicates
the presence of intention to bring about the harm which
2
occurred .

In evaluating the import of "wanton negligence" it is necessary to
consider singularly the meaning of the word "wanton". The Restatement
of Torts states in effect that an intentional act by a person who knows or
has reason to know it creates an unreasonable risk of harm, and that there
is a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result, is wanton. 13
It is characterized as "conduct . . . in reckless disregard of the bodily

security of others",'14 "recklessness" evidently being synonymous with
"wantonness." 5 It is not necessary that the actor realize that his conduct
is extremely dangerous, it being enough that he knows or has reason to
know of facts which would make a reasonable man realize the danger
involved.'
It has often been expressed that a different state of mind on
the part of the actor is required in the commission of a wanton act as distinguished from a negligent act.17 Thus while negligence may consist of
mere inattention or inadvertence, wantonness requires a conscious indifference to highly probable consequences.'" The culpability of such conduct
ii. "'Wilful Negligence' is an obvious misnomer." Frederick v. Philadelphia R.
T. Co., 337 Pa. 136, 140, 1o A. (2d) 576, 578 (1940) ; "Negligence and wilfulness are
as unmixable as oil and water. 'Wilful negligence' is as self-contradictory as 'guilty
innocence.'" Kelly v. Malott, 135 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o5) ; "To speak of 'wilful
negligence' is like talking of a 'black white' object." ELDREDFEfMODERN TORT PROBLEMS (1941) I65; PRossER, TORTS (941) §38.
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 282, comment c.
13. Id. at § 5oo.
14. Id. at § 5oo, comment a.
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934), Special Note to § 5oo. It is interesting to note
that the drafters of the Restatement thought it necessary to point out in a special note
that the term "wilful and wanton" carried such conflicting connotations that they excluded it completely. See also Special Note to § 336.
x6. Id. at § 500.
17. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943) ; Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. R. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 427 (19o8) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 500, comment g and § 282, comment d. It is to be noted that
§ 5oo does not require actual conscious indifference to consequences, it being sufficient
that a reasonable man would have realized the great danger. The Atchison case describes this as "constructive knowledge." 79 Kan. 183, i89, 98 Pac. 8o4, 8o6. Thus,
although one of the alleged distinctions between negligence and wantonness is said to
be the state of mind, an objective test is applied to determine this state of mind. Assuming the result reached is desirable, it would seem that this "state of mind" is an
artificial one and that perhaps the "degree" analysis comes closer to actualities. See
Cooley, note io supra, at 348. This thought has been stated in the following manner:
"The conduct to be proved is not the conduct which a reasonable and prudent man
would not have exercised, for such objective standard applies only in true negligence
cases." Elliott, Degrees of Negligence (x932) 6 So. CALIF. L. REv. 91, 143.
IS. The Kansas Court describes this state of mind with the following illustration:
"The only respect in which his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the intentional
wrong-doer is that instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another he is merely willing to do so. The difference is that between him who casts a missile intending that it
shall strike another and him who casts it where he has reason to believe it will strike
another, being indifferent whether it does so or not." Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v.
Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 19o, 98 Pac. 8o4, 8o7 (i9o8).
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is said to be so great that a type of intentional harm is involved.1 9 This
has been described as quasi-intent.20 This school of thought would conwantonness differs from negligence not merely in
cude, therefore, that
21
degree but in kind.

On the other hand wantonness has been classified as an aggravated
type of negligence 2 2 differing from ordinary negligence not in kind but
merely in degree.2 3 It is based on the fact that negligence itself is a rather
amorphous standard, representing the commonsense ideas of fairness entertained by the community and that although it is possible to sit down with
paper and pen and present very scientific and analytically correct postulates as to just what constitutes negligence and just what constitutes wantonness, that as a practical matter these subtle distinctions are ignored or
produce undesirable results. 24 The words of Mr. Justice Holmes express
this thought thus: "Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout
the law." 25
The Restatement's analysis of this "degree or kind" concept seems to
grasp its true significance where it states that:
"The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving
only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a
difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind." 26
Under either view "wanton negligence" would seem to be an undesirable term. If a difference in kind, an objection analogous to that presented
by the terms "wilful negligence" exists; if a matter of degree, the term
does not add to the clarity of determining that degree, although the objection is less strong under the latter view.
19. PROSSaR, op. cit. supra note iI; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases
(1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173. Thus this type of conduct sometimes results in awards
of punitive damages and is a bar to the defense of contributory negligence. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 204, 34 A. (2d) 523, 525, 526 (1943) ; PRossFR, op. cit.

supra note II, at § 52; HARPER, ToRTs (1933)
20. ELmolr, note 17 supra, at 143.

§ I51-

21. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943) ; Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. R. v. Bakhr, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (i9o8) ; Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311,
196 N. W. 398 (1923) ; HARI'Z, op. cit. supra note i9.
22. PRossER, op. cit. supra note i.
". . . all courts recognize a type of aggravated negligence described as wilful, wanton or reckless conduct...."
23. One writer in discussing the contradictions and litigation surrounding these
words resulting from rigid classification states that: "The inevitable difficulty of defining a matter of degree in absolute terms will not explain them." COOLEY, note 1o
supra, at 349. This analysis does not embrace the concept of "degrees of negligence"
in the sense that that concept attempts to break down negligence into categories within
itself such as "gross," "slight," and "ordinary." Rather it attempts to point to the logical difficulties in attempting rigid categorization founded on an artificial basis. The
concept of negligence is relative, and thus a matter of degree in the sense that the
gradations of conduct from ordinary inadvertance to wilful misconduct cannot accurately be separated by sharp lines. At least confusion is not lessened by so doing. See
PRossER, op. cit. supra note i;
ELLioTr, note 17 supra. This idea may be more colorfully stated as follows: "Every sensible judge or lawyer or law teacher is well aware
of the fact that these legal phrases are not accurate measures like the yardstick in the
Bureau of Standards. They can more fairly be compared to a chart of colors which
is construed to give some indication of the differences between scarlet and crimson and
so forth, in spite of the fact that its maker knows that every color shades by imperceptible degrees into every other." Chafee, note I supra, at 393.
24. See page 439 infra for a discussion of recent cases reaching such undesirable

results. PRossER, op. cit. supra note it.
25. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 133, 66 L. Ed. 254, 267
(1921).

26.

RESTATEMENT, ToRTs

(934)

§ 500, comment g.

NOTES

Various other word combinations such as "wilful and wanton negligence", and "wanton and gross negligence", merely add to the general
confusion.
It would seem therefore, that if we are to retain our present method
of dealing with negligence problems, which finds it desirable to attach
certain legal consequences to conduct which is characterized by the term
"wanton", that the term should be used with clear discrimination. It is
submitted that from the standpoint of clarifying this rather hazy standard
the phrases "wanton misconduct" 27 and "conduct in reckless disregard of
safety" 28 are analytically preferable.
The foregoing rather abstract rationales of negligence are of little
pragmatic value to the practicing lawyer. However, they help to focus
attention to a more or less limited area within the doctrine while at the
same time they give a truer perspective of the factual background from
which they grew. Furthermore they set before us the efforts of the courts
to solve negligence questions by categorizing misconduct. Just how successful this categorization has been will now be considered by examining
specific cases.
1129

The possessor of land has traditionally enjoyed a very protected position in our law. 0 However, as modem civilization has matured, a greater
emphasis has been placed upon the social value of human life which has
resulted in a gradual erosion of the possessor's unrestricted use of land. 31
Although this compromising process was deemed desirable, the landowner's
position was so well established that the courts found it difficult to state
frankly that they were invading it. Consequently, the desired ends were
reached by applying various fictions and devices. Today, when these
artificialities are no longer necessary they remain to plague us.
The first exception to the possessor's general immunity was the rule
that he could not inflict intentional injury upon a trespasser.3 2 The modem
vestige of the rule with which this note is chiefly concerned is its modification stating that no duty is33owed to a trespasser except to refrain from
"wilful or wanton" conduct.
As previously noted, 4 the well established
rule in Pennsylvania is that a possessor of land is liable to a trespasser only
for "wilful and wanton misconduct." To determine just what this means
we must keep in mind the definition of a trespasser, the distinction between
the liability arising from active conduct on land and that arising out of
27. Mr. Justice Stern indicates this in Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. i99, 202, 34
523, 525 (1944), where he states: ". . . if he was guilty of what is usually
denominated 'wanton negligence' (although a better term would be 'wanton miscon-

A. (2d)

duct') ..
28. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 500.

29. The writer has drawn heavily on the views of Professor Eldredge expressed

in his MODERN TORT PROBLEMS (1941) in the chapter entitled "Tort Liability to Trespassers," which originally appeared in (1937) 12 TEMP. L. Q. 32.
3o. ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 164-165. PROSSER, op. cit. pra note ii, at
§77; RESTATEMENT, ToRTS (934) §-333.

31. "In fact, the substantive changes in the law, particularly in America, relating
to liability to trespassers have been tremendous. During the last half of the nineteenth
century and down to the present a developing law. of negligence has battered continually at the gates guarding the immunities of possessors of land." ELDREE, op. Cit.
supra note 29, at 166.
32. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 13o Eng. Rep. 911 (1828) ; Robison v. Rupert,
23 Pa. 523 (1854) ; Lewis v. Fleer, 30 Pa. Super. 237 (igo6).
33. Eldredge, op. cit. mpra note 29, at 65.

34. See page 432 mtpra.
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conditions upon the land, and the difference between the possessor's liability to adult trespassers and his liability to infant trespassers.
"A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the
possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's
consent or otherwise." 35 If the possessor has given his consent the entrant

is a licensee.3 6 In many of the Pennsylvania cases where this requisite
permission was absent the court has allowed the entrant recovery for harm
caused by other than "wilful and wanton" conduct by calling him a
"licensee." Perhaps in these situations the court could not bring itself to
call the conduct "wilful and wanton", however since they felt that "justice"
demanded that a recovery should be had, they enlarged the possessor's
duty to trespassersby calling them licenses.3 7 Since this contrivance alone
was not enough to meet the changing demands of society the court found
the words "wilful and wanton" another very handy device in helping to fill
these needs. They achieved their ends by misdefining and emasculating 8s
"wilful and wanton" to include a failure to use ordinary care
after the
trespasser's presence is discovered.39 We have seen that the term wanton
alone is difficult to define; this deliberate misdefinition adds to the diffi40
culty.

Trespassers and Activity on Land
In Petrowski v. Phila. & R. Ry, 4' the court said :42 "...
where
one, knowing that a child of tender years is trespassing upon a vehicl
under his care, negligently acts in such a manner as to injure the trespasser, the conduct of the transgressor is viewed in law as 'intentional', or

wilful and 'wanton'.

4

35. REsTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) §329.
36. Id. at § 33o. This consent does not necessarily mean an invitation to enter, it
being sufficient if the entry has-been permitted. Just what constitutes such permission
is determined by applying the reasonable man test. See § 330 at comments a and d.
37. These are the so-called "permissive crossing" cases. Kay v. Pa. R. R., 65 Pa.
269 (1870)'; Phila. & R. Ry. v. Troutman, II W. N. C. 453 (1882) ; Kovarik v. Lehigh V. R. R., 24o Pa. 533, 87 Atl. 779 (1913) ; Smith v. Phila. & R. Ry., 274 Pa. 97,
117 AtI. 786 (I922). Professor Bohlen has more accurately described such entrants
as "tolerated intruders."
38. Professor Bohlen describes this process in the following language: "Modern
students . . . are beginning to recognize what may be termed the 'invocatory' word.
By this is meant a word which has customarily been used to describe a siuation that
has habitually been recognized as requiring a particular legal result. Students are
being taught to realize that, where this result is desired, courts often justify it by using
such a word to describe a situation to which the word is entirely inappropriate if it be
taken in its traditional sense and not so extended as to be valueless as a word of definition or even of description." Bohlen, Old Phrasesand New Facts (1935) 83 U. oF PA.
L. REV. 305, 310.

In a recent case the court frankly admitted that the entrant was a trespasser but
that the possessor was liable in the following language: "Toleration of trespass for
sufficient time gives use to privilege which adds to the duties of the occupier in the
maintenance and use of his premises." Hogan v. Etna Concrete Block Co., 325 Pa. 49,
51, 188 AtI. 763, 764 (1936) (italics added).
39. Eldredge, op. cit. supra note 29, at 177; Prosser, op. cit. supra note Ii, at § 77.
4o. For a discussion of this problem in a jurisdiction which -has experienced a development remarkably similar to that of Pennsylvania, see Notes (1924) 8 MINN. L.
Rav. 329, (1939) 24 MINN. L. REv. 81.
41. 263 Pa. 531, 107 Atl. 381 (1919).
42. Id. at 536, io7 Atl. at 382 (italics added).
43. Ibid.
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In a similar case the court said: 4" "If defendant's engineer, knowing
that a child of tender years was trespassing on the tracks of the defendant,
nevertheless negligently acted in such a manner as to injure the child, his
conduct would be viewed in law as 'intentional', or 'wilful', and 'wanton'."
In Cover v. Hershey, the court stated: 45 "The children were trespassers and the trial judge rightly charged the jury there could be no recovery except for a wilful or wanton injury. .

.

. To be wilful or wanton,

the act must have been done with knowledge. In the instant case, to
create liability the motorman must have known of the perilous position of
the children in time to stop his car and neglected to do so. .

.

. If on

seeing their perilous position he failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid
the accident, his conduct was wanton within. the meaning of the law."
This language is typical of that found in those cases involving children
injured by activities carried on on the land where the court thought relief
should be granted despite the fact that the children were clearly trespassers
as distinguished from "licensees." 46 It seems highly unfortunate that the
court continues to go through the rigmarole of using the term "wilful and
wanton" when it actually means ordinary negligence. The inevitable results
of such practice are added4 7confusion and undesirable decisions where the
words are literally applied.
Although most of the cases permitting recovery involve infant trespassers, adult trespassers are not precluded from obtaining redress for
negligent injuries from activity on land after their presence becomes
known.
In Frederick v. PhiladelphiaRapid Transit Co., 48 the adult plaintiff
slipped from a subway platform into the path of a starting train which
automatically stopped when it touched him. After a brief search by the
conductor, who had been warned by a bystander that someone was under
the train, it started again, passing over the plaintiff's body and badly
injuring him. Although the plaintiff was not technically a trespasser since
he did not put himself upon the plaintiff's tracks voluntarily, the court
treated him as "if he were a trespasser" 49 and allowed him recovery saying: 'o "As applied to the type of cases of which the present is an example,
it is not wanton negligence to fail to use care to discover the presence of
an unanticipated trespasser, but it is wanton negligence, within the meaning
of the law, to fail to use ordinary and reasonable care to avoid injury to a
trespasser after his presence had been ascertained. . .

."

The result of

this decision is sound 11 but again we have the court paying "lip service"
44. Reagan v. Reading R. R., 126 Pa. Super. 175, 179, 19o Atl. 412, 414 (1937)
(italics added).
45. 290 Pa. 551, 556, 557, 139 Atl. 266, 268 (1927) (italics added).
46. Crowley v. Pa. R. R., 231 Pa. 286, 8o At. 175 (I9II) ; Piepke v. Phila. & R.
Ry., 242 Pa. 321, 89 At. 124 (1913) ; Trevethan v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 244 Pa. 414,
9o At. 796 (1914) ; cf. Daniels v. Helman Coal & Coke Co., 279 Pa. 47, 123 Atl. 653
(1924) ; Peden v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 324 Pa. 444, 188 Atl. 586 (1936).
47. See page 439 infra.
48. 337 Pa. 136, 140, IO A. (2d) 576, 578 (1940).
49. Id. at 139, IO A. (2d) at 578. See Dobrowolkski v. Pa. R. R., 319 Pa. 235,
238, 239, 178 Atl. 488, 489 (935) ; RETATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 158, comment e.
5o. Id. at i4o, 1o A. (2d) at 578.
51. Although it did not appear that the plaintiff was actually a "discovered trespasser," the defendant was certainly put on guard as to his presence in this case by the
automatic stopping of the train and by the warning of the bystander. As the court
points out: "Most of the decided cases have been concerned with the question whether
the trespasser was seen by the person sought to be charged with negligence. The eye,
however, is only one of the sensory organs which bring information to the brain, and
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to those weasel words "wanton negligence". 52 It is interesting to note
that the courts are somewhat conscious of the artificiality of what they are
doing by the qualification found in most of the cases, namely, that the conduct is "wanton negligence within the meaning of the law".
In Kennedy v. Southern Pa. Traction Co.5 the truck of the adult
plaintiff skidded off the highway and overturned on the defendant's tracks,
trapping him within it. When the trolley came within 150 feet of the
plaintiff the motorman abandoned the controls and ran for safety to the
rear of the car which continued on until it struck the truck. In holding
the defendant liable the court said:"5 "While the status of the plaintiff
upon the right-of-way of the defendant may have been that of a trespasser,
the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses was sufficient, if believed,
to enable the jury to find that the motorman of the trolley was "culpably
negligent."
This case takes a forward step in Pennsylvania negligence law in at
least two respects. First, it allows a discovered adult trespasser to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of the negligent conduct of a possessor;
and secondly, it dispenses with the mythology of using "wilful and wanton"
to describe such negligent conduct. Unfortunately, however, that step is
not as full-strided as it might have been, for the court's use of "culpable"
in describing the negligence surrounds the conclusion with the vagueness
which that word carries with it.
Trespassersand Conditions on Land
No Pennsylvania cases grant relief to an adult trespasser for injuries
arising out of conditions on the possessor's land, even though such conditions are highly dangerous and the presence of the trespasser is known."5
Where the trespasser is a child the picture is somewhat different.
Here the immunity of the landowner has had to give way in certain situations to the value which the community has placed upon the lives and
safety of its children.58 There has been much writing and discussion of
this phase of tort law, with the "attractive nuisance" doctrine and its
attendant fictions occupying the center of interest.5 7 This note will be
confined to the effect of the words "wilful and wanton" upon the landowner's liability to trespassing children.
is not the sole means by which knowledge, in a legal sense, may be acquired. Notification may also come from an apparently trustworthy person who is himself an eye-

witness. Indeed, there is authority to the effect that even where the circuxiistances are
such that the likely presence of a trespasser is foreseeable, the duty of care to avoid
the injury to him arises." Ibid. See Francis v. Baltimore and 0. R. R, 247 Pa. 425,
428, 429, 93 Ati. 490 (ii5) ; Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 576, lO9 Atl. 653
(1920) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 334 and PA. ANNOT. thereto, dealing chiefly
with the so-called "permissive crossing" cases.
52. It is interesting to note that the court considered that the amendment of the
statement of claim by adding the charge of negligence to that of recklessness and -wantonness "was unnecessary because included in the more comprehensive allegation of
reckless and wanton action." Although unnecessary, would it not add to the clarity of
the cases to discard reckless and wanton and call it what the court says it actually isnegligence? Frederick v. Phila. R. T. Co., 337 Pa. 136, 142, IO A. (2d) 576,579 (940).
53. 333 Pa. 406, 3 A. (2d) 395 (1939). This case is noted in (0939) 87 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 876.
54. Id. at 412, 3 A. (2d) at 398 (italics added).
55. Sections 335 and 337 of the Restatement of Torts illustrate progressive at-

tempts to extend the possessor's liability to adult trespassers but there is little authority
to support them.

56. "The true basis of the duty is the value of child life to the community." ELDop. cit. supra note 29, at 191. Green, Landowner v. Intruder,Intruder v. Land-

RmaGE,

ozter (1923) 21 MICH.
57. HARPER, op. cit.

L. REv. 495.

supra note ig, at § 93 ; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note II, at § 77.

NOTES

In approaching this problem it will be useful to consider the Restate-

nent which scraps all the unnecessary fictions applied in these cases and
substitutes a simple rule whereby the court examines each case to see if
certain factual conditions exist. If they do, the landowner is liable.
Thus: 51s

"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young
children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial
condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such children are
likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is
slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
This rule has been highly commended for clarifying the landowner's
duty to trespassing children with regard to conditions maintained on his
land. 9 Yet in two recent cases the Pennsylvania Supreme Court completely disregarded it by literally applying the rule that the only duty owed
to a trespasser is to refrain from "wanton or wilful injury."
In Dumanski v. City of Erie,6 0 the city maintained a dump, making
no objection to its use by individuals. A fourteen year old boy, left the
only path on the dump to explore a cinder pile which was about 50 feet
away. From the top of this pile there protruded a frozen mass of cinders
which formed a cave. While the boy was inside, it collapsed, resulting in
his death. The court denied any liability on the part of the city stating in
effect, that while the continued use of the path with the knowledge of the
city was sufficient to give one using it the status of a licensee, the activity
of this boy beyond the path changed his status to that of trespasser "and
the only duty of the city was to refrain from inflicting upon him any
wanton or wilful injury." 61
Here the possessor knew of the likelihood of trespassing children, they
being the most frequent users of the pathway. It should have realized that
the condition involved an unreasonable risk of death to such children.
Furthermore it seems obvious that the utility to the possessor of maintaining the cinder pile in this dangerous condition (which could have been
eliminated with very little trouble) was slight as compared to the risk
involved therein. The only factual condition set up by the Restatement
test which is not clearly met here is whether the child because of his
58. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339.
59. "The best statement yet made ..
"
PRossER, op. cit. supra note ii, at 620.
op. Cit. supra note 29, at i89.
60. 348 Pa. 505, 34 A. (2d) 5o8 (1944). Cf. Maksimshuk v. Union Collieries Co.,

ELDREDGE,

128 Pa. Super. 86, 94, 193 Atl. 669, 672 (1937), where the court reached a sound de-

cision but unfortunately talked "wilful and wanton" in so doing; Powell v. Ligon, 334
Pa. 250, 5 A. (2d) 373 (939) (condition created on a highway) ; Rahe v. FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co., 318 Pa. 376, 178 Atl 467 (1935) ; Krepcho v. City of Erie, 145
Pa. Super. 417,

21

A. (2d) 461 (1941) ; Krystopowicz v. Reading Co., 40 Pa. D. & C.

304 (1940).
61. 348 Pa.505, 507, 34 A. (2d) 508, 5o9 (1944).
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62
youth did not realize the risk involved in meddling with the condition.
even
not
court
did
The most significant thing however is the fact that the
consider these elements. Why? It seems clear that it was deceived by
the ambiguity surrounding the term "wilful or wanton", for by a literal
application of these words it foreclosed all further considerations.
63
In Pravlik v. City Deposit Bank and Trust Co., the facts were as
there was a
property
follows: At the rear of the appellee landowner's
stone wall eighteen feet in height, the unfenced top of which was on the
same plane and adjacent to the alley above. Because of the absence of
mortar (which condition was clearly visible from appellee's property) one
of these stones came loose when a fifteen year old boy, who had been
searching for a baseball, stepped upon it. As a result he fell, and the loose
stone landed upon him, causing the injury. Previously the lessee of the
property had warned the boy not to trespass and had further warned him
that the wall was dangerous. The court denied liability stating that because
the plaintiff was a trespasser the "appellee owed him only the duty to
refrain from inflicting upon him any wanton or wilful injury." 64
Here again the court precluded itself from any consideration of the
Restatement test by literally interpreting the rule that the only duty owed
to a trespasser is to refrain from wilful or wanton conduct. Such a rule
does not represent the general trend of the Pennsylvania cases 65 which
follow the Restatement in holding the landowner to a higher standard of
duty where trespassing children are involved. Might not the opposite conclusion have been reached in this case if the court had examined the facts
in the light of this higher standard?
Manifestly the likelihood of children trespassing on this unfenced wall
which was adjacent to, and on the same level as the alley, was very great.
Furthermore the possessor here actually realized that the absence of mortar
created a serious risk of harm to anyone who so much as stepped upon the
wall. The utility of maintaining a wall in this condition seems very slight
as compared to the risk to children involved therein. Certainly the use of
the premises would in no way be restricted if it were repaired, and the
expense entailed would not seem prohibitive. Here, as in the Dumanski
case, the condition whether the child because of his youth did not realize
the risk involved in his conduct, is not clearly met. However, it seems
reasonable to conclude at least that a boy searching for a ball does not
consciously trespass in a spirit of recklessness or bravado.66 .When all
these factors are considered together it seems reasonable that a conclusion
granting the child recovery might be had. However, assuming that the

62. For the propositions that the mental capacity of the child is not to be determined by any arbitrary age limit and that children as old as sixteen have been allowed
recovery, see PaossEa, op. cit. mtpra note II, at § 77.
63. 348 Pa. 5o8, 34 A. (2d) 510 (i944).
64. Id. at 511, 34 A. (2d) at 511.
65. ".

.

.

it may be said that the Pennsylvania law is somewhat confused.

But the generaal trend is definitely in line with the rule of the RESTATEMIENT." ELI)
REDGE, oP. cit. supra note 29. at 193.

See Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332

(1877) ; Duffy v. Sable Iron Works, 210 Pa. 326, 59 Atl. i oo (x9o4) ; Hogan v. Etna
Concrete Block Co., 325 Pa. 49, i88 Atl. 763 (1936). Contra: Thompson v. Baltimore
and 0. R. R., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (907) ; Zamaria v. Davis, 284 Pa. 523, 131 Atl.
37, (1925) ; Feehan v. Dobson,

2o

Pa. Super. 6 (i899).

66. See Rodgers v. Lee, 140 Pa. 475, 22 At. 399 (i89i) ; Brown v. Scranton, 313
Pa. 230, 169 At!. 435 (1933).
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conclusion reached by the court is justifiable,67 it is submitted that the
manner of reasoning applied to reach it is not.
Thus, the paramount criticism of this and the Dumanski case is not
that the landowner should have been held liable but rather that the court
did not consider the possibility that he might have been held liable under
the Restatement's higher standard of duty solely because it was misled by
a literal interpretation of the outmoded rule that a trespasser can recover
only for injuries received as a result of "wilful or wanton" conduct.
"Wilful and Wanton"-In Situations Other Than Trespass on Land
It is very important that a clear distinction be kept between that
peculiar set of rules involving the words "wilful and wanton" which has
developed around the possession of land and trespass thereon and those
rules involving this phrase where the incident of landownership has no
particular significance. 68 In the former class the words are used to describe
the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care, while in the latter they are
used to describe conduct which is "in reckless disregard of the safety of
others."
One group of cases in the latter class involves the vicarious liability
of a principal for the "wilful or wanton" conduct of his driver toward
riders who are on the principal's truck without his consent and against his
instructions to the driver.
Thus in McGinnis v. Peoples Brothers, the court said: 69 ,.. . there
could be no recovery unless the jury found from the evidence that they or
their driver wantonly or intentionally inflicted the injury complained of."
In Perrin v. Glssport Lumber Co., the court said: 7

".

.

. the driver

of the truck has no implied authority to carry the injured child. He was
not engaged in furtherance of his master's business in so doing, and for
his negligence, if any appeared, the employer cannot be held responsible.
Though engaged in the work of the lumber company, the harm was caused
by an act done beyond the scope of his authority, and no liability attached
to the defendant, in the absence of proof that the conduct resulting in injury
was wilful and wanton."
In Collins v. Rosenberg, the court said: 71 "The unauthorized act of
the servant in suffering a third party to ride upon a truck cannot impose
on the master the duty of safe carriage, or make him liable for any injury
the third party may suffer from the act of the servant unless it be wilful
and wanton. .

.

. To be wilful the harm must have been intentionally

done, and to be wanton must have been committed with a reckless disregard of the rights of others."
The language of these cases indicates that the problem before the
court is not one of trespass on land but rather whether a principal will be
67. In Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 591, 23 A. (2d) 729 (1942), Mr.
Chief Justice Maxey applied the Restatement test of § 339, and allowed the child trespasser to recover. Nowhere in the opinion did the words "wilful or wanton" appear.
This case indicates the more desirable process of reasoning which should be applied
to these cases,-one which will lead to better substantive results. It is submitted that
if the anachronistic rule that the only duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain from
"wilful or wanton" misconduct had been applied in this case there would have been no
recovery. See also Altenbach et ux. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 349 Pa. 272 (June 2,
1944), discussed in note 87 infra.
68. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 336, Special Note.
69. 249 Pa. 335, 338, 94 Atl. 925, 926 (igi5).
7o. 276 Pa. 8, 12, 119 AtI. 719, 720 (1923) (italics added).
7r. 1O6 Pa. Super. 269, 272, 276-277, 161 At. 58o, 581, 583 (1932).
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held liable for the injuries resulting from unauthorized acts of his servant. 72
The test of liability is one of "wantonness"--"wantonness" in the sense of
"aggravated negligence" or "conduct in reckless disregard of the safety
of others." Thus, while in those cases where the servant is acting within
the scope of his authority, ordinary negligence on his part causing injury
to a known trespasser creates liability on the part of the master, more than
ordinary negligence is necessary to impose liability where the acts are
unauthorized.
In other words if the servant acts wantonly, in the
analytically correct sense of that term, the master is liable whether the acts
are authorized or not.
In Bowman v. PennsylvaniaR. R., 73 a swiftly traveling train crashed
into the rear of another, resulting in the death of a passenger who was
riding on a free pass which contained a stipulation against liability "for
injuries regardless of their cause." Plaintiff alleged that the failure of the
engineer to observe a red signal light caused the injury and that such conduct was "wilful, wanton or gross negligence." The court held that such
conduct as the plaintiff alleged was wanton and would have entitled him
to a recovery but that he failed to establish it with the burden of proof.
The court went on to point out that the release relieved the railroad of
liability from ordinary negligence but not where the injury was the result
of "wilful, wanton or gross negligence." Although the language used is
not the most desirable it seems clear that here the court is describing that
nebulous area ,which exists between ordinary negligence and intentional
misconduct i. e.-that it is using "wilful and wanton" in an entirely different
sense than it did in the trespass on land cases.
In Humpoltz v. Hyman, the court concluded: 7 4 "A dentist, who without justification.pulls a perfectly sound tooth, might be said to be guilty
not only of carelessness but of wanton recklessness." Here again the
court is describing conduct which is in "reckless disregard of the safety of
others." In fact this conduct has been defined as an "unprivileged battery",75 indicating to a further extent how varied indeed are the uses of
"wanton."
Kasanovich v. George 76 is the most recent Pennsylvania case involving wanton conduct as it is defined in section 50o of the Restatement. In
that case a laborer, on a street improvement project, while walking about
eighteen inches from the track, was struck from the rear by a street car.
Although the motorman had the decedent under continuous observation for
a distance of 2o0 feet, he failed to sound the gong or slacken, speed until
after he had struck the decedent. In describing the motorman's conduct as
wanton the court said: 7 "It must be understood of course, that wanton
72. "In this connection it should be noted that we are not here dealing with the
nature and extent of the duty of an owner of land to a trespasser thereon, nor with the
kind of conduct which might subject an employed driver to liability for injury to a
rider upon a vehicle under his control. It is here sought to impose liability upon an
absent owner for the negligence of its chauffeur." Jacamino v. Harrison Motor Freight
Co., i35 Pa. Super. 356, 362, 5 A. (2d) 393, 396 (939) ; see also Stefan v. New Process Laundry, 323 Pa. 373, 377, I85 Atl. 734, 736 (i936) ; Tusko v. Lynett, 326 Pa. 449,
192 Atl. 410 (1937); cf. Rapczynskd v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 392, 396,
io A. (2d) 8io, 813 (1940).
73. 299 Pa. 558, i49 At. 877 (1930).
74- 70 Pa. Super. 581, 583 (19,9).
75. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNoT. (1937) § 50o.
76. 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943).
77. Id. at 203, 34 A. (2d) at 525.
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misconduct is something different from negligence however gross,-different not merely in degree but in kind, and evincing a different state of mind
on the part of the tortfeasor." This case brings into sharp focus the important distinction between the meaning of "wilful and wanton" in trespass
on land cases and that involved in non-trespass cases. That this distinction
must be kept clearly in mind in Pennsylvania will be illustrated by the
following discussion of this state's doctrine of contributory negligence.
III
The doctrine of contributory negligence has been rigidly adhered to
in Pennsylvania.1 8 While in most other jurisdictions the courts have rebelled against its harshness 79 and have modified its strictness either by
the doctrine of last clear chance or the theory of comparative negligence
or theories of "proximate cause", the Pennsylvania court has expressly
refused to do so. 80 However even the Pennsylvania court has finally
squarely held 81 that contributory negligence will not be a defense where
the defendant has been guilty of "wanton misconduct." In so holding it
pointed out that this was the first appellate court case in Pennsylvania to
directly decide the question, being careful to explain that such a decision
was "not in conflict with the rejection in Pennsylvania of the doctrines of
'comparative negligence and last clear chance'." This decision brings
Pennsylvania into line with the generally accepted rule that as to conduct
which is characterized82 as "wanton" or "reckless" contributory negligence
will not be a defense.
It is immediately obvious that the word "wanton" assumes even
greater significance with the decision of this case, for upon the future interpretation given to it by the court when dealing with problems of contributory negligence, rests the outcome of many cases. In fact with the
decision of the Kasanovich case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
reached a legal crossroad.
On the one hand is that large group of cases involving trespass on
land in which "wanton" means ordinary negligence. On the other hand
is that group of non-trespass cases where "wanton" means "conduct in
reckless disregard of the safety of others." As previously noted, the problems created by this judicial double-talk are in themselves quite significant.
Now add to this picture the doctrine expressed in the Kasanodch case
that contributory negligence is no bar where the defendant has been guilty
78. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (1937) § 465, 467.
79. PossER, op. cit. supra note ii, at § 52: "With the change in social viewpoints,
it has been looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts, and various attempts
have been made to modify its rigors." See Cooley, note io supra, for an excellent discussion of the problems of contributory negligence in which he heartily disapproves of
the doctrine.
8o. "The doctrine of comparative negligence has not been recognized in our state.
Any negligence on the part of a plaintiff that contributes to, and is the proximate cause
of, his injury defeats his action. There can be no balancing or matching of degrees of
negligence." Weir v. Haverford Electric Co., 221 Pa. 6II, 617, 7o Atl. 874, 876 (19o8).
"Nor has Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine of the 'last clear chance'. . . ."
Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 202, 349 A. (2d) 523, 525 (1943).
81. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (943) ; see also Misorski
v. Pa. R. R., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A. (2d) 526 (1943). Prior to these decisions there were

several dicta indicating "adherence to the view prevailing in other jurisdictions." These
are cited in 348 Pa. at 203-2o4 and in 34 A. (2d) at 525-526.

82. 38 Am. JuiL, Negligence, § 178, and cases cited in note 8; 45 C. J. 981

§ 533d (i), and cases cited in note 5o;

RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934)

§ 482 (i).
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of "wanton" misconduct. If this means only that conduct which is
"wanton" in the sense of recklessness as defined by section 5oo of the
Restatement then the rule is in accord with the settled authorities.
However, if the court does not keep clearly in mind the distinction
between the two groups of cases, it is very likely that it may rely on one
of the trespasser cases for its definition of wantonness. If this comes to
pass Pennsylvania will find itself adopting the last clear chance doctrine
under the guise of "wanton" misconduct, despite all its express denials to
the contrary.
That this is more than mere abstract theorizing is illustrated by the
experience of the Minnesota court where precisely the same situation
arose. 3 It is now a well settled rule in that state that contributory negligence is no defense where the defendant has been guilty of "wilful and
wanton negligence,"-which is defined as a "disregard of the safety of the
person or property of another by failure, after discovering the peril, to
exercise ordinary reasonable care to preventthe impending injury... ." 84
In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance 8 5 allows a negligent plaintiff to recover if the negligent defendant had a superior opportunity to
avoid the harm. The doctrine is divided into two chief phases. The first
is known as the "conscious last clear chance" and applies where the defendant actually discovered the plaintiff in time to avoid injuring him.
The second is known as "unconscious last clear chance" and applies where
the defendant did not actually discover the plaintiff but where he should
have reasonably done so. Because of its definition of "wanton" the Minnesota court has limited the application of its disguised last clear chance
doctrine. 88 Under the Pennsylvania definitions however, the door is wide
open, for, as has been previously discussed, the "wilful and wanton" language in the child trespasser cases involving conditions on land (as distinct
from activities) includes the duty to anticipate the likelihood of trespass.
In other words it is very possible under our definitions to accept both the
"conscious" and "unconscious" phases of the last clear chance doctrine.
Thus, in Pennsylvania, the possibilities presented by the decision of the
Kasanovich case are great enough to bring about by indirection far greater
changes in th.e doctrine of contributory negligence than the court has been
willing to adopt expressly and directly.
It is interesting to note that this apparent dilemma is the result of the
head-on collision of two somewhat artificial legal "devices." The first is
the device of describing ordinary negligence in terms of wantonness, which
the courts found necessary to circumvent the immunity held by the landowner in the rule that his only duty to a trespasser was to refrain from
"wilful or wanton" misconduct. The second is the "device" of escaping
the rigors of the doctrine of contributory negligence by describing the conduct of the defendant as "wilful or wanton." When the two come together
in a trespass on land case, if the court is not careful, it will create still a
third "device", namely, the circumvention of the rule of contributory
83. Notes (1924) 8 MiNN.L. Rav.

84.

329, (1939) 24

MINx. L. REV. 81.

go.
85. HARPER, op. cit. supra note I9,at § 138; PRossaa, op: cit. supra note
Note (I939) 24 MINN. L. Rzv. 8i,

ii, at

§ 54; Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (19o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 233; Lowndes, Contributory Negligence (1934) 22 GEORGETOWN L. J. 674; James, Last Clear Chance: A
TransitionalDoctrine (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 704.
86. Teal v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 379, 380, 1o4 N. W. 945 (io5) ; Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., io3 Minn. 224, 114 N. W. 1123, 14 L. P_ A.
(N. s.) 886 (908).
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negligence in cases involving ordinary negligence simply by delineating the
conduct as "wilful or wanton."
There would seem to be three major possibilities as to the course which
the court may adopt in the future. In the first place it may follow the path
taken by the Minnesota court, thus adopting the last clear chance doctrine.
In the face of its past decisions this does not seem very likely to happen.
Secondly, it may choose to scrap all its former "lip service" to the
words "wilful and wanton" in the trespass cases and bury them forever by
clear judicial utterance that the duty owed by the landowner is one of
ordinary care. 7 Such a result is highly probable and should prove to be a
substantial improvement over the existing situation.
Finally the court-or the legislature-may do a thorough housecleaning by discarding the entire doctrine of contributory negligence as
well as the anachronism of "wilful and wanton" in trespass cases. Loud
and long have been the rumblings of discontent against this harsh doctrine.
The present apparent dilemma brings into sharp focus the artificialities
and difficulties which surround it. This would seem to be the logical time
to look for a more desirable substitute. It is submitted that this is to be
found inf the doctrine of comparative negligence (preferably entitled comparative damages). It is not the purpose of this note to fully discuss the
merits of this doctrine, however it may be pointed out that today at least
eleven jurisdictions find it practically workable.8 8 Learned writers endorse
it as a forward step in alleviating the harshness of a rule which puts all the
cost of an injury upon one party even though the other party was chiefly
87. One such utterance has quite recently been made by Mr. Chief Justice Maxey
in Altenbach et ux. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., argued January 6, 1944, reargument refused May 22, 1944, to be published in 349 Pa. 272 (June 2, 1944). In this case a young
child walked through a hole in a disrepaired fence and drowned in the defendant's
reservoir which was located in a well-populated residential district where many children resided and played. In holding the possessor liable the court said: "The nature

of the occupier's duty to such children is that of ordinary care. He must not create
risks reasonably tending to cause injury." (Italics added.) No mention is made of
that historic rule that the only duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain from "wilful
or wanton" misconduct. This case represents the actualities of the existing law in clear
language. It discards the unnecessary and undesirable fiction of "wilful and wanton"
and should result in more desirable decisions.
88. Second Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65, 66 (igoS), as amended
by 36 STAT. 291 (1901), 45 U. S C. A. §§ 51-59 (1926) ; The Merchant Marine Act,
41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 861 et seq. (1926). These two statutes are discussed by Mole and Wilson in A Study of Comparative Negligence (1932) 17 CORN.
L. Q. 333, 359-366.
GA. CODE ANN. (Park, 1933) tit. 66, § 402; Goodrich, Origin of the Georgia Rule
of Comparative Negligence and Apportionment of Damages (1940) GA. B. A. REP.
174.
NED. ComP. STAT. (Dorsey, 1929) § 20-1151. Note (1938) NEB. L. B. 68.
Miss. CODE ANN (1942) § 1454. Note (1938) Miss. L. J. 221.
S. D. CODE (939) § 52.0945; Berg, Comparative Negligence-A Substitute for
the Rule of Contributory Negligence (ig4i) 9 S. D. B. J. 200.
VA. CODE ANN. (I942) § 3959.
WIS. STAT. (937) § 331.045; Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law
(1932) 7 Wis. L. REV. 224; Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence (1941)
Wis. L. REV. 289.
Bar. COL. STATS. (1925) c. 8; NEW BRUNS. REV. STATS. (927) c. 143; NOVA
SCOT.STATS. (1926) c. 3; ONT. STATS. (1930) 20 Geo. V, c. 27, amended in (1931) 21
Geo. V. c. 26.
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responsible.89 Furthermore it is to be noted that active steps have already
been taken toward effectuating the doctrine in Pennsylvania, for on March
8, 1943, a bill was introduced in the House of90 Representatives proposing
adoption of a rule of comparative negligence.
What turn will Pennsylvania take as it stands at this crossroad? A
categorical answer would be pure speculation. However, whichever path
it follows, it seems clear that the result of such choice will create an interesting and significant change in Pennsylvania tort law as it exists today.
M. W., Jr.
89. ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 237, reprinted from (T939) PA. BARAssx. Q.
64; GREGORY, LEGISLATivE Loss DIs~mBuxoN ix NEGL GENCE ActioNs (1936) 53;
PaossER, op. cit. supra note ii, at § 53; Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative
Negligence (1932) i7 CORN. L. Q. 333.
go. House Bill No. 6o4 introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature by Representative Joseph Skole, ist district; discussed in Note (1943) 17 TEtr,. L. Q. 276.

